Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Adressbuch > Search > Benutzer/Kontakt Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] search_str - Results Affected Section(s): [+] Results - Index (Listing) Proof of Concept: ================= The persistent vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers with privileged paypal user account and low required user interaction. For demonstration or reproduce ... PoC: [Existing Listing] (Index) Adressbuch > Search > Benutzer/Kontakt > results
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Note: The name with the code was saved in the addressbook. Only the matching and successful result leads to the persistent execution of the web context. When the other user is searching the existing account of the addressbook the code will be executed persistent out of the matching search result web context listing. If you do not know this it will be a bit harder to reproduce. The bug is 100% existing because the screenshots show it and also the poc. I found the issue by manually exploitation over the different application layers and function. Maybe i guessed to implement this details to the submission. The requested code with the malicious persistent code can be reviewed in the attached poc document. Manually reproduce ... 1. Go to the addressbook and switch to add a new contact to adressbook 2. Include script code (html/js) as username to the addressbook and save the context 2. Now, switch to the user search (addressbook) module (other layer) & click the user contact search to activate 3. Include the exact name of the username (script code (html/js)) from the addressbook and press the search button 4. The context of the other layer from the addressbook will be executed directly out of the results listing page of the exisiting user contacts 5. Done! POST REQUEST: method="post" name="searchContact"